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Abstract
Discussion of prefigurative politics typically focuses on the revisioning of means to ends within 
grass-roots activities taking shape against or apart from the state. This article takes a different 
approach. Addressing prefiguration through the terms of the ‘as if’, it explores the assertion of 
counterhegemonic meanings, facts, norms and authority both by and about institutions, including 
state ones. Through four contentious acts: municipal expressions of international solidarity; 
legislating new gender categories; role-playing micro-states and new money; and acting like a law 
reform commission, the article considers what prefiguration, and reading for prefiguration, can 
contribute to a progressive transformative politics. While rehearsing, anticipating and representing 
alternatives are important, well-recognised prefigurative attributes, this article also addresses 
less explored dimensions. Specifically, it considers how institutional prefiguration retroactively 
constitutes its conditions of legitimacy and authority, its depiction as fiction, the performative 
constraints it faces from diffuse and unequal circuits of power, and the work done by recognition 
(and non-recognition) of new facts, rules and norms. Together, these dimensions speak to the 
complicated and plural character of what is real when institutions are enacted as if they were 
otherwise. This quality of being both real and not real, in conditions of wider opposition, support 
and torpidity, constitutes the crux of prefiguration’s efforts and promise.
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What to do with the institutions of the global north has long been a left preoccupation. 
Should they be demolished, amended, appropriated, or abandoned so new institutions (or 
anti-institutions) for more progressive living can emerge? This article routes the question 
of institutional change through prefiguration where, in Luke Yates’s (2015, p. 4) words, 
people ‘enact some feature of an “alternative world” in the present, as though it has 
already been achieved’. Today, prefiguration is mainly associated with grass-roots poli-
tics, organising independently of state institutions or against them.1 Marianne 
Maeckelberg (2011, pp. 13–14) writes, ‘Redesigning power is not a demand one can 
make from the state. . . . The aim of developing . . . new structures is to slowly make the 
state and multilateral organizations obsolete.’
Yet, state and other institutions, as socio-political assemblages, should not be dis-
counted when it comes to prefigurative practice (see also Cooper, 2019a). Their social 
pervasiveness and taken-for-grantedness, their formative and ordering capacity, their 
power, as well as their plasticity and agency, make them necessary sites for transforma-
tive action. But also – in a country such as Britain, the empirical focus of my discussion 
– these qualities make institutions challenging change-subjects as well (see also Mackay, 
2014; Waylen, 2014). Adopting an expansive account of institutions, to take in more than 
rules (including the tacit ‘rules of the game’),2 I approach institutions as durable, pat-
terned processes and formations, tying together rules, procedures, norms, systems, 
knowledges, temporalities, spaces, things, moralities and people in ways that are mean-
ingful, forceful and with effects. This does not mean institutions are stable or monolithic 
(see also Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Waylen, 2014). They evolve and change; are plural, 
heterogeneous, and contradictory; and can be counter-cultural and hybrid as work on 
critical institutionalism also explores (e.g. Cleaver & de Koning, 2015). Yet, despite their 
variation and contingency, institutions remain important to the extent that patterns, rou-
tines and processes – established and recognised by dominant forces, and giving rise to 
unequal effects – exist. Indeed, it is this very existence which stimulates and provides a 
target for critical (as well as more hopeful) political engagement.
This article focuses on four different institutions, state, law, money and gender, cho-
sen for their interconnections as well as their differences, and for their capacity to be 
prefigured in the sense of embodying new, socially preferred norms and values. I discuss 
prefiguration in more detail below. Moving beyond an incremental stretching or tinker-
ing with present practice, prefiguration aims to bring into being changes that seem right 
or at least preferable. With its focus on doings and enactments, prefiguration should not 
be dismissed as escapist pipedreams or fantastic forms of wishful utopianism. Instead, as 
bold enactments of a revised or alternative reality (that sometimes settles within the 
world of play and sometimes exceeds it), prefiguration poses challenging and important 
questions about how enactment and imagining, truth and fiction, calculation and improv-
isation get rendered one thing or another, how they combine in pursuit of change, and 
what this combining can accomplish.
To explore this further, I take up one specific version of prefiguration, focused on the 
‘as if’. The ‘as if’ has a life outside of the prefigurative (e.g. Vaihinger, 1924; see also 
Stampfl, 1998).3 Casting blame on marginalised subjects as if they were responsible for 
societal wrongs and harms is one well-established form, where accusations and claims 
are made for what they do rather than for their accuracy. But my interest here is in 
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prefigurative institutional action, where a preferred set of conditions, facts, possibilities 
and norms are enacted (or assumed to be already in place). This form of institutional 
prefiguration can face rightwards – witnessed in the 1980s prefiguring of the neoliberal 
state (see Cooper, 2017). My focus here is otherwise: the take-up of institutional pre-
figuration within progressive social justice politics, while addressing how fraught and 
contested this nexus can also prove. Four British-based sites anchor the discussion: 
(1) municipal solidarity with Palestine; (2) legislative take-up of ‘new’ gendered identi-
ties;4 (3) grass-roots re-enactment of statehood and money; and (4) a university research 
project’s prefiguring of a legal agenda. Through these sites, I explore different kinds of 
‘as if’, including those with a retrospective orientation: acting as if the legal and politi-
cal conditions necessary were already in place; and those that face forward, where bod-
ies act as if they have the performative force that they need. Thus, we might distinguish 
between conditions of authorisation and conditions of accomplishment, even as, in 
practice, they are not that easily separated.
Exploring different registers and dimensions of institutional prefiguration sheds light 
on what prefiguration does – what it brings, and fails to bring, into being – in contexts 
where actors may (or may not) interpret their actions in these terms. Reading for the 
prefigurative ‘as if’ also means tracing how actions get recognised as fictive or real. 
While the former may be an accusation made by others, it can also function as a protec-
tive strategy, carving out an insulated space for initiatives that might seem threatening if 
assumed to be seriously real. Such attempts are not always successful, and conflict over 
the ontological status of prefigurative action confronts many initiatives as I discuss. 
Institutional prefiguration is subject to different perspectives and beliefs about what is 
taking place. But what also emerges in discussing the prefigurative ‘as if’ are the differ-
ent, often competing, realities actually taking place (Bottici, 2014; Law & Urry, 2004). 
This presence as both real and not real constitutes the heart of prefiguration’s efforts and 
promise.
From reassembling means and ends to the ‘as if’
Conventional left politics typically distinguishes between means and ends. Good ends 
justify dubious means, and means are simply that – strategic ways of changing how 
power is organised, and who controls it, where power is something that can be seized, 
turned and converted to emancipatory ends. Prefigurative politics, in its common formu-
lation, rejects this approach. It rejects the notion that cruel or authoritarian measures can 
bring forth a democratic and kind society. And it rejects the notion of power as a thing or 
quantum that can be seized and redirected.
Today, a vibrant literature exists on prefigurative politics: from the prefigurative 
aspects of camp and square protest politics (e.g. Van der Sande, 2013), and anti-austerity, 
pro-migrant activism (e.g. see Mensink, 2019); to writing on anarchist social centres, 
alternative environmental, gardening and food initiatives, peace politics, children’s play, 
intentional communities and everyday utopias (Carroll et al., 2019; Cooper, 2014; Fois, 
2019; Moore et al., 2014; Silver, 2018; Thaler, 2019; Thorpe, 2018). But prefiguration is 
not only about grass-roots practice. While little attended-to within the literature, public 
bodies can also engage in prefiguration, practising alternative forms of government and 
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welfare in the political meanings, principles and forms of authority they enact. 
Demonstrating ‘what could be’ through the measures they introduce, progressive actors 
seek to cultivate a desire for change across institutional scales. David Blunkett, council 
leader of the northern UK city Sheffield in the 1980s, for instance, described municipal 
radicalism as a rehearsal: showcasing, in his words: ‘what we could do as a Socialist 
government at national level’ (quoted in Gyford et al., 1989, p. 329).
But in rehearsing the future or getting the ‘means right’, prefigurative emphases and 
orientations vary. One approach focuses on the anticipatory enactment of good ends or 
shared commitments (e.g. Ishkanian & Peña Saavedra, 2019): living communally or 
more ecologically, refusing to adhere to gender roles, practising leaderless governance or 
representing a nation as existing before it juridically does, for instance. Dan Swain (2019, 
p. 55) describes such ‘ends-guided’ prefiguration as ‘concerned with specifying the 
future in order to live up to it’ (see also Boggs, 1977). A different prefigurative emphasis 
suggests that, since all actions inevitably shape the futures they give rise to, ends are not 
detached from means, and good ends cannot be produced from bad means. Dan Swain 
(2019, p. 55) refers to ‘ends-effacing’ prefiguration, which ‘collapse[s] the future into the 
present, rather than holding them apart’. If the means determine the ends – indeed, if 
there are no ends but just further means – how politics is done becomes important, and 
so foregrounding horizontal, inclusive, participatory and consensual decision-making 
methods comes to sit at the heart of prefigurative concern. A third prefigurative approach 
emphasises constant revaluation and experimentation in relation to both means and ends. 
Van de Sande (2013, p. 232) refers to ‘an inherently experimental and experiential prac-
tice’ where ‘both the envisioned ends and means of prefigurative practice are continu-
ously subjected to evaluation and reformulation’. Finally, a fourth rejects the notion of 
‘future’ ends, with its depiction of a time to come that can be meaningfully planned for 
and rehearsed, in favour of an uncertain insurgent now.
In practice, these different prefigurative emphases and orientations often combine. 
However, the relationship of means to ends, as a relationship to invert, implode, or rein-
vent, dominates discussion. But there is another way of approaching prefiguration. This 
backgrounds the temporal relationship of means to ends to focus instead on the relation-
ship between the real and the ‘as if’ (see also Thaler, 2019). Sometimes this assumes a 
playful register, as in the founding of a new fictive micro-state. Other times, it takes a 
more serious form – the political authority local government asserts in undertaking inter-
national affairs.5 Yet, whether done playfully or seriously (and of course these two are 
not easily distinguished as I discuss), the ‘as if’ quality of institutional prefiguration typi-
cally remains unannounced. Unlike prefigurative registers which explicitly foreground 
the relationship between means and ends, here the effectiveness of what is done (or the 
worldmaking it is part of) may depend on obscuring its ‘as if’ character. Yet, the ‘as if’ is 
important. When overtly aligned with play, it allows actions to happen – crowd-sourcing 
a people’s constitution,6 for example – that might otherwise struggle for lack of official 
propriety and formal legitimacy. More generally, acting ‘as if’ gives political action a 
boost. This is partly because innovative, utopian or provocative actions happen despite 
lacking the institutional conditions they seem to require. But it is also because actions 
reimagine their conditions of possibility, and act as if they were already there. 
Prefigurative action entails a significant reimagining of the environment in which action 
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is set so that a social, scientific, ethical and political ‘otherwise’ justifies, validates, nor-
malises and holds up the actions undertaken. Yet, as I discuss, such a reimagined envi-
ronment can also prove shaky and be, at times, sharply contested. This article therefore 
explores the possibilities, but also the limits, of acting as if things were otherwise; to 
consider what it does and does not bring into being; and how it both unsettles and recon-
solidates accounts of political reality.
It is easy for a discussion of the ‘as if’ to slip into confirming the real: as something 
distinctively different, and something which remains distinctively different, from the 
wishful prefigurative enactments taking place. In this article’s examples, the ‘as if’ relies 
on a sense of something missing – where acting ‘as if’ has this identity because formal 
authority, official recognition, scientific credibility, or social take-up are absent or 
because the ‘as if’ operates in a zone of uncertainty between established or emerging 
truths.7 However, lack of factual or normative authority is not necessarily constant or 
permanent. It can diminish over time; and indeed, this diminishment is part of what pre-
figurative action can accomplish. In her discussion of legal statuses derived from acting 
‘as if’, Jessica Clarke (2005) explores how behaving like an owner or parent may create 
legal rights despite a lack of formalities or biological ties, respectively. In this article, 
acting ‘as if’ can sometimes bring into being the missing elements of authority, recogni-
tion, science or entitlement required to make an enactment ‘real’ – at least for certain 
normative communities.8 However, as Clarke (2005, p. 564) discusses, when this does 
not happen, and the ‘as if’ works to accentuate instead the presence of a distinct and 
separate (legal) reality, the consequences can prove severe. In her examples, ownership 
becomes theft, and parenthood becomes abduction. In my discussed acts, responsible 
government becomes illegitimate overreach, and law becomes ridicule. But, as I 
explore, recognition as real can also have its problems.
Four prefigurative acts
Acting as if local government had the authority to advance an 
international agenda
Prefiguration usually focuses on what is done: from developing hyper-democratic forms 
of protest to living one’s gender or relationship with the environment differently. But what 
is practised is more than life’s material side. Prefiguration can also relate to meaning – not 
as a disembodied abstract affair, but in the meanings taken up, expressed and enacted.9 
When meaning is enacted in prefigurative ways, prevailing accounts and understandings 
are shed in favour of preferred ones; and while these can be critical (as when the left con-
demns an otherwise valorised part of mainstream life), my focus is on meanings that 
invest a form, typically rejected by the left, with hopeful possibility.
Take the state. Left-wing scholarship typically treats the state as an oppressive, 
coercive institution that supports dominant power relations, most notably capitalism 
(Jessop, 1990, 2002). For anarchists, especially, the state is oppressive by definition 
(see Newman, 2001; also Kinna, 2020; Springer, 2012). Here, oppression is not a prob-
lem of specific state forms, of authoritarian states as opposed to democratic states, but 
is inherent to the very notion of the state itself. But if states can be imagined in quite 
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different ways, what might progressive forms of imagining entail? Can we think of 
states as democratically embedded governance formations that promote social justice, 
and that take shape as local, micro and global states as well as national ones,10 where 
the nation-state is no longer the primary model for being a state? While this may seem 
an aspiration to mobilise politically around, approaching it prefiguratively suggests it 
is a meaning that can be practised and have effects. Several scholars have explored the 
difference that different state imaginaries make to politics, studying how groups and 
individuals act differently thanks to the ways they understand the state (Gill, 2010; 
Navaro-Yashin, 2012). These analyses do not centre on prefigurative accounts.11 But 
what if state actors take up and manifest conceptions of the state as caring, responsible, 
solidaristic and activist? What can imagining the state in these ways, and acting as if 
these ways were true ways, do?
Adopting a prefigurative understanding of the state might mean decentring the nation-
state as the state’s paradigmatic form for other shapes and scales (see also Cooper, 2017, 
2019a). It might mean thinking the state against its standard pyramidic form (or at least 
imagining this verticality differently). Putting such a state account into practice is not 
mere fantasy. Instances do exist. One involves local councils acting as authorities enti-
tled to advance international agendas and pursue social justice in the face of countervail-
ing national state law and policy. Acting like a state is something local government 
sometimes does. In Britain, its most recent comprehensive heyday was the 1980s, when 
urban councils across the country advanced an ambitious left agenda of economic 
democracy, social justice, environmentalism, decentralisation and democratisation 
against, and in defiance of, the Thatcher government’s political programme of privatisa-
tion, conservative familial relations, authoritarian policing, right-wing crime and union 
laws, and welfare retrenchment (see Boddy & Fudge, 1984; Gyford, 1985; Lansley et al., 
1989; Seyd, 1987). A less comprehensive, more recent instance is the (episodic) support 
shown by councils to Palestine through statements of solidarity, Palestinian flag-waving, 
municipal visits to the West Bank, and resolutions in favour of the international boycott, 
divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign to put pressure on Israel (Cooper & Herman, 
2019). The last decade witnessed several UK local authorities passing motions to with-
draw contracts and investment. Stirling’s motion, passed in 2010, is typical. It
. . . condemn[ed] the Government of Israel for its continuing illegal occupation of East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza. . . . [The] Council therefore resolved to 
re-assess its current procurement arrangements and ensure future agreements and contracts 
boycott all Israeli goods. [The] Council also agreed to write to all Scottish Local Authorities, 
Westminster and Holyrood Governments calling on them to implement an immediate boycott 
of all Israeli goods. (Stirling Council, 2010)12
By arguing for municipal boycotts – here, in support of Palestine – councils express, and 
to some degree actualise, a challenging imaginary of what it means to be both a state and 
a local state. This is a conception that places a moral responsibility on municipal govern-
ment to advance the wellbeing of others, including those at a geographical distance. 
Responsibility, here, is not contingent on prior wrongdoing but based on an institutional 
capacity to act in ways that might make a difference. It is also a conception of the state 
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which recognises state bodies’ right to engage in activism, by advocating changes they 
cannot themselves bring about. In such instances, government is not only the practice of 
governing, it can also involve promoting a cause, as Leicester city council’s boycott 
motion illustrates.
Leicester is a City renowned for its tolerance, diversity, unity and its strong stance against all 
forms of discrimination. . . . It is . . . important when there is oppression and injustice, that 
Leicester City Council takes up a position to support communities experiencing such inequalities 
and in this instance it is the plight of the Palestinian people.13
Municipal participation in BDS enacts a prefigurative conception of the state in which 
governmental bodies do not form a neat, orderly hierarchy.14 Different bodies’ authority 
comes from different places and can conflict. In this instance, municipal authority comes 
from a critical moral injunction to act in ways that alleviate suffering, including among 
people in another jurisdiction, an authority maintained and rationalised by local govern-
ment’s electoral contract with adult residents. This political account generated objections 
but, briefly and episodically, it fed a different imaginary of the state, actualised in munic-
ipal motions and other activities.15 This was not an imaginary that denied national laws’ 
capacity to practically constrain what councils could do. As the council minutes detailing 
the Stirling motion make clear, inhouse legal advice often prompted councils to explic-
itly place their boycott within the terms permitted by national regulations.16 At the same 
time, it poses an imaginary of the state which denies central government its exclusive 
status as the source of municipal legitimacy. Given the presence of coexisting sources, 
superordinate institutional rules can be contested, reinterpreted and, on some occasions, 
trumped (see also Waylen, 2014, p. 216).
Yet, acting as if local government can advance foreign policy does not necessarily 
make it realisable. In this episode, municipal activist state imaginaries confronted those 
of critics, determined to sustain national government’s authority in deciding foreign pol-
icy relations and who ‘our friends’ are.17 Adopting a conservative hierarchical imaginary 
of the state, opponents represented local government as little more than a subordinate 
apparatus properly attuned to local concerns. It was irresponsible and overreaching, then, 
for councils to use their commercial, investment and procurement powers to interfere in 
international politics. In 2014, when some British councils flew the Palestinian flag to 
protest Israel’s violence in Gaza, Communities Minister Brandon Lewis described their 
action as a ‘clear political statement on an area of public policy [over] which the munici-
pal body has no responsibility’.18 This state imaginary was not just expressed in speeches, 
statements and media interviews. It also drove central government’s procurement and 
pensions’ investment guidance,19 and subsequent litigation.20
The prefigurative ‘as if’ treats the meaning of concepts, such as the state, as able to be 
stretched and cut in different ways. It opens discussion about what institutions should be 
like, unsettling common assumptions, for instance, that the state is, or should be envis-
aged as, the nation-state. By shifting expectations, practices develop in new directions. 
Because some relevantly-situated actors think the local state can properly engage in 
advancing global justice – that this is a legitimate part of what municipal government can 
be and do – a course of action is embarked upon. In other words, prefiguration doesn’t 
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just coat existing actions with more progressive meanings. Rather, certain actions hap-
pen because of the more progressive meanings (including norms and assumptions) taken 
up. At the same time, through being taken up and acted upon, new meanings may con-
solidate. Acting in solidarity with oppressed people at a distance can change accounts of 
local government’s authority and responsibilities – at least for some. But there are also 
risks in prefiguring the meaning of the state. One is that critical understandings become 
marginalised. Understanding state bodies in prefigurative ways can seem to deny the 
state’s more disturbing features, naively sanitising an institutional ontology through cul-
tivating excessive faith in what state bodies can accomplish. Institutional sanitisation by 
the left, when it comes to the state, has not been much in evidence in 21st century Britain, 
in contrast to the local state imaginaries enacted and circulating through 1980s British 
municipal socialism (Boddy & Fudge 1984; Lansley et al., 1989). Today, concerns about 
prefigurative conceptualising, if not expressed in exactly these terms, seem more evident 
in relation to other institutions, to which I now turn.
My focus is gender.21 In Britain, what gender means has become bitterly contested as 
conventional assumptions of two natural and properly complementary social categories, 
anchored in biology, have been displaced. One emerging view approaches gender as a 
benign identity – an intimate part of one’s being that can take different forms, with no 
necessary relationship to biological sex.22 A different view sees gender as an oppressive 
form of asymmetrical social control. Feminist scholarship, for some decades, has 
approached gender’s oppressive character in ways that also recognise agency, provision-
ality and intersectional inequalities and differences. However, the women-centred 
approach to gain prominence within the British public sphere of the late 2010s is rather 
different. It views gender as socially imposed on reproductively binary, sexed bodies – 
where one class, men, dominates another class, women (e.g. Jeffreys, 2014). From this 
perspective, understanding gender as identity dangerously obscures gender’s imposed, 
external, unequal, and far from natural or desirable, constraining force.23
Gender as identity and gender as class domination represent two competing para-
digms that are rapidly gaining visibility and influence. While other critical accounts of 
gender endure (and continue to emerge), the alignment of these two accounts with liberal 
discourses of rights, discrimination, interests and vulnerability, albeit in relation to dif-
ferent subjects, has enhanced their discursive authority. I explore their confrontation in 
more detail elsewhere (Cooper, 2019b); what I want to explore here is its prefigurative 
cast. Proponents of both positions act as if the meanings they articulate are true – reflect-
ing what gender really is. While, at one level, this is a routine, unsurprising mode of 
political discourse, what makes it distinctive here is the way state law has become 
enrolled.
Acting as if state law can define what is
The explicit development of new gender meanings and practices is typically associated 
with intimate relations, identity-based communities, and counter-publics. What hap-
pens when state law, itself, assumes this task? What effects does this have on how 
social life is understood and lived? The discussion above focused on an officially sub-
ordinate state body, UK local government, approaching its role and authority 
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in subversive ways – acting as if it had the power and right to engage in international 
solidarity politics. Here, I consider how one officially powerful institution, state law, 
understands another: namely gender – an institution that is powerful and sometimes 
official. In my fourth act, I consider a move that would make gender less official. But, 
for now, my focus is on the move to redefine what gender formally is by moving 
towards a legal account of gender as a self-determined property of selfhood.
Law composes the truth in many ways. Legislation routinely encodes values, histori-
cal presumptions, and normative expectations about social life. As such, it can character-
ise social arrangements in heavily partisan or ideologically contentious ways, where 
treating social meanings as if they were otherwise takes up hostile rather than positive 
understandings, such as the negative legal encoding, in Britain, of gay life as ‘pretended 
family relationship’,24 or in the more recent example of a 2019 proposed Kansas Bill on 
‘parody marriages’ (see s. 2(e)), which legally defines:
. . . a variety of so-called marriages that do not involve a man and a woman. . . . The term 
‘parody marriage’ refers to so-called marriages between more than two people, persons of the 
same sex, a person and an animal, or a person and an object.25
Alongside group marriages and, somewhat bizarrely, marriages to non-human animals 
and things, same-sex marriages become legally redefined as ‘parody’, as legislation gets 
taken up to disparagingly represent life as lawmakers and social movement activists 
would like it to be understood.
State law’s capacity to redefine gender-based practices can also take a less hostile 
shape. One early 21st century British episode involved government consultations on 
reforming the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 2004 to make transitioning simpler. The 
GRA established the procedure for people to change their legal sex/gender. By the 
2010s, concerns that the procedure was cumbersome, pathologising and costly, and 
increasingly outdated (given light-touch measures emerging elsewhere), precipitated 
growing demands for reform. In the 2017/18 Scottish government’s consultation on the 
Act, one question asked was whether moving towards a ‘self-declaration’ approach 
(para 3.26) should explicitly embrace people who identified as ‘non-binary’ (part 7).26 
While some jurisdictions have moved in this direction (e.g. see Clarke, 2019; Holzer, 
2018), British governments’ consideration of a similar move generated intense opposi-
tion, particularly from women’s sex-based rights advocates, who argued (among other 
things) that self-determined gender identity, and law’s recognition of multiple genders, 
took leave of scientific reality. One organisation, responding to the Scottish consulta-
tion, declared,
A man or a woman is not a gender identity but the name for a reproductive sex. . . . A penis is 
male, a vulva female. . . . Woman = XX Man+XY. . . . For a government to seek to abolish 
the common understanding of man and woman . . . cannot be right. It cannot be right to infer 
that human beings are not sexually dimorphic, that there may be in fact 3 sexes (and why just 
3?) without any evidence.27
From this perspective, legal attempts to replace the concept of binary sex with a triad or 
constellation of self-determined genders was, as another group dismissively put it, to 
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allow ‘a feeling in your head’ to override ‘the objective reality of bodily sex’; to ‘codify 
this belief into law’ turned law into ideology.28
I return to the politics of this perspective shortly. Yet, the notion that law and the ‘as 
if’ are antithetical to one another negates a common feature of legal practice. Earlier I 
referred to Jessica Clarke (2005, p. 563) who describes how ‘de facto performances [can 
be transformed] into de jure protections’, where acting as if one is an owner or parent can 
bring such statuses into legal existence. In other cases, through the notion of ‘legal fic-
tion’, law places acts and statuses within legal categories that would seem, in everyday 
speech, false or improper;29 a common example being the treatment of corporations as 
legal persons.30 It is not because corporations act like people that they are legally treated 
as such. Rather, being treated as a legal person gives corporations access to a controver-
sial set of legal rights and powers.31 A different legal fiction concerns the status of trans 
men giving birth, currently defined in British law as ‘mothers’ for birth certificate pur-
poses on the grounds that anyone who gives birth is, by definition, a mother.32 This is a 
pragmatic move, bringing those giving birth into a nominal category that socially, and 
indeed, legally (if they have a Gender Recognition Certificate) they are deemed not to 
properly belong in. While it may have ideological implications, and while it may put 
pressure on social categories – for instance, by unleashing legal parenthood status (as 
mother/father) from legal sex (as female/male)33 – like other legal fictions male mother-
hood does not seek, at least not explicitly, to make ontological claims (see also Knauer, 
2010). But what about legislating ‘new’ understandings, for instance that gender means 
gender identity? This is not presented as prefigurative, since declaring its aspirational 
and contested status would undermine the solidity of its claim that it reflects what is, and 
what is already true. And, it is this claim to describe what is (true) – definitionally and 
empirically – that critics fear, on the grounds contested claims will be buttressed and 
naturalised through state law-making power (see generally Valverde, 2003).34
Legislating gender as identity, with only certain gender categories legally available 
(see Katyal, 2017), takes up, it is suggested, state law’s capacity to discipline and 
order, so everyone is accounted for and no one or nothing, in Rancière’s terms, is left 
over. There is male, female and, increasingly, the catch-all residual category ‘non-
binary’ for everyone else. The trouble, for many critics, is that this converts a feminist 
politics – intent on eliminating stereotypical and hierarchical assumptions about male 
and female – into a gender-right to choose, with a special box now available for those 
who don’t fit traditional ones (also Holzer, 2018).35 As Margaret Davies (2008, 
p. 299) writes: ‘recognising two (or more) “types” of legal subject may be less exclu-
sive than simply recognising one, but multiplying the categories of legal subjects may 
simply multiply zones of exclusion and effectively force people to identify with a 
particular type’. Jessica Clarke (2015, p. 753) makes a similar point, arguing that state 
recognition of certain elective genders ‘may pigeonhole liminal, marginal, disruptive, 
diverse, and dynamic identities into a set of ill-fitting options, or penalize them with 
nonrecognition’. Beyond the iceberg tip of a new gender category or categories, what 
also seemingly gains a legal foothold is a notion of gender as denoting an intimate 
part of personhood. But what follows from this? If state law declares that gender is a 
core aspect of identity, possibly flexible, and something that comes in three or more 
shapes, does this then become true?
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I do not want to dismiss state law’s capacity to forcefully represent and shape life and 
concepts, ‘the determinative power of the state – and its codes – in determining, recog-
nizing, and ultimately administering identity’ (Katyal, 2017, p. 411). However, beyond 
juridical apparatuses and officials’ take-up of new legal terms of recognition, state law is 
prefigurative because (and to the extent that) it cannot determine the categories and 
meanings that social life relies upon.36 State law can certainly ‘declare’ what gender in 
general means, the gender categories it recognises, and the mechanisms and evidence it 
accepts for determining category membership (see also Butler, 2015, pp. 28–29).37 And 
these institutional declarations do work – legally, politically and socially – driving vari-
ous forms of enactment and organisational reform. But the work new legal terms under-
take is mediated and overlaid by complex, intricately networked and uncertain processes 
of realisation as other organisational and community norms mediate, interpret, ignore 
and resist state law.
The limited ability of law to conclusively establish social facts is apparent in its 
‘postfigurative’ legal character – operating as if a past imagined reality still endures. 
British law, for instance, still assumes only men and women exist, despite people claim-
ing and inhabiting other gender identities, and despite communities and organisations 
recognising other gender identities also. If law cannot sustain an older gender narrative, 
outside its own most closely controlled arenas and performances, then presumably it 
cannot impose a new one. New state truths don’t roll over social life but mix with it. As 
Roderick Macdonald writes: ‘However formal or informal a legal order, however for-
mal or informal a norm, human action will mould the institutional practices and the 
prescriptions into a complex normative environment’ (2011, p. 321; see also Butler, 
2015, pp. 30, 32; Samek, 1977, p. 417). As a result, the social force and effects of state 
law recognising three or more genders is uncertain. Will it undo the naturalised status 
accorded to male and female, scoop up and contain those who do not fit, make some 
lives easier, complicate equality provisions, offer a new status quo for radical gender 
politics to challenge and extend, or some mix of all of these? What these questions pose 
is the importance of – if not exactly institutional non-performativity (Ahmed, 2012) – 
then of something uneven, contested and only partially realised.
Discussion of prefiguration tends to focus on what is achieved. But in some cases, as 
with state law, prefiguration’s value may also lie in its limited force to bring about new 
meanings. Legislative reforms can recognise or represent a social world as if it were 
otherwise, yet lack the sovereign power to make it so. Recognising the value of a partial 
performance, or one not fully realised, is not simply about wanting certain reforms to fail 
(even as we may despair when others remain only ‘as if’). What prefiguring here affirms 
is something else, namely, the value of a more diffuse constellation of power where insti-
tutional forces, such as state law, are unable to fully control or determine social meaning. 
This diffusion is valuable in its own right. It can also be valuable as a way of maintaining 
tension between what is, what was, and what could be. I return to the question of power’s 
diffusion below in relation to the challenge of institutional recognition. But first I want 
to introduce two other kinds of prefigurative act. So far, I have considered prefigurative 
acts by state institutions. The rest of this article changes tack to consider how regular folk 
might experimentally, and sometimes playfully, prefigure public institutions, including 
the state.
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Acting as if secession and the reinvention of currency were possible
Radically revising the state is not easy – especially in the absence of intensive political 
power. Yet, interesting and diverse attempts to prefigure the state exist, including through 
the rehearsal and practice of new national forms. Chiara de Cesari (2012), Fiona 
McConnell (2016) and Jacob Mundy (2007) have written strikingly about attempts to 
prefigure Palestine, Tibet and Western Sahara, respectively. These attempts rework, in 
part, what it means to be a state but, primarily, they are about anticipating and helping to 
attain nation-statehood through forms of representational enactment. My interest here is 
with a different kind of prefiguring: role-playing the state and its institutions with-revi-
sions, where play captures the creative and strategic pleasures of action that, concertina-
like, extends and compresses the space between what is real and what is simulated (or 
pretend); where what is actualised expresses an imaginary that extends (intentionally or 
otherwise) beyond what can be realised.38
Some kinds of state mimicry seem entirely play; for instance, the simulation of insti-
tutional structures, such as mock parliaments or model United Nations, which pedagogi-
cally immerse young people in institutional apparatuses to learn how they work (e.g. 
Dittmer, 2013).39 As with virtual play worlds, such as the online role-play game Second 
Life (Boellstorff, 2008), these mock institutions do not typically seek to affect or even 
critique the structures they mimic. I therefore turn to a form of prefigurative play that is 
more critical and ambitious, drawing on two recent historical examples which evoke the 
diverging ways state institutions can be prefigured. The first is Frestonia, self-described 
as a Free Independent Republic,40 and formed from an eight-acre squatted neighbour-
hood, around Freston Road, in West London’s Shepherds Bush. In 1977, the Greater 
London Council (GLC) sought to expropriate people’s homes to redevelop the area. In 
response, residents declared secession. They applied to the United Nations for member-
ship, informing them that if the GLC invaded and forced evictions, ‘There will exist a 
crisis with international ramifications, and . . . Frestonia [may] require the U.N. to send 
a token peace-keeping force’.
Inspired, it seems, by the 1949 Ealing comedy Passport to Pimlico,41 Frestonia fash-
ioned a parodic and playful micro-nation, wittily mimicking the state’s most emblematic 
parts – with passports, postage stamps, visas and ministerial titles. At the same time, its 
statehood was presented as democratic and egalitarian. Everyone was made a minister, 
including children, and all took the same surname – Bramley – so (if their state failed) 
they would have to be rehoused as a single family given GLC policies at the time. For 
Frestonia was not entirely or simply play. Claiming secession was part of a serious 
attempt to protect residents from eviction and maintain their community, against indus-
trial redevelopment, and in this they were successful. Yet, their state parody contrasts 
with a second kind of role-play I want to consider involving local currency networks.
Local Exchange and Trading Schemes (or LETS) developed in British Columbia, 
Canada in the 1980s before rapidly spreading internationally. In their British heyday of 
the 1990s, small local currency networks (of 50 to 500 people) developed across the 
country. LETS functioned as a form of multilateral barter, where people identified their 
wants and offers – from knitting cardigans to providing gardening, repairs, or transporta-
tion – and then performed exchanges using local currency cheques. Unlike Frestonia, 
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which fashioned a kind of state that was ironic, socially empowering and miniature, 
without seriously intending to prefigure the state, LETS creatively repurposed the state 
function of making money, refusing to treat money as the state’s exclusive preserve 
(North, 2006; Seyfang, 2001; Williams et al., 2001).42 We might think of LETS as a 
counter-institution, refashioning money outside of capitalist norms. Instead of tying 
money to investment and accumulation, money became encoded as a form of communi-
cation and exchange that would support a socially responsible local economy anchored 
in, and helping to grow, community ties. I originally became interested in LETS through 
research on everyday utopias (Cooper, 2014), keen to explore what an attempt to perform 
money differently could accomplish. My own and others’ research showed how LETS 
cultivated exchange relations oriented to sociality, generosity, more equal pricing, sus-
tainability and reuse, with a more relaxed attitude to time and timing. However, the 
development of a new money form also encountered difficulties. Exchange costs, social 
awkwardness, timing difficulties, uneven quality, mismatched wants and offers, and lack 
of participation-energy, led schemes, in Britain, to remain too small and under-utilised to 
be viable (see also Aldridge & Patterson, 2002; Evans, 2009). Not enough trading hap-
pened, and by the turn-of-the-century LETS were increasingly displaced by other, more 
limited, exchange projects such as time banking.
LETS did not demonstrate prefigurative play as Frestonia and other utopian role-play 
projects did – with their sometimes satirical, usually exploratory, re-envisioning of insti-
tutional renewal. Still, we can read LETS as play in other respects. Performing selling 
and buying in a reinvented mode of economic exchange, LETS demonstrated the move-
ment and elasticity – the ‘play’ – in imagining and enacting an alternative economic 
structure that occasionally realised a new form of money. Discussing state law’s chang-
ing understanding of gender, I suggested one value of institutional prefiguration, if para-
doxically, was its inability to fully realise an agenda or intent, for this failure demonstrated 
the diffuse character of power – uncaptured by any single apparatus. LETS demonstrated 
the positive character of failure in another way – not as the inability fully to realise a new 
kind of money, but in the enactment of an ambition that exceeded what could be real-
ised.43 In other words, while British LETS proved unable to bring into being, in their 
more radical register, a revised ‘money-ness’ of money, they were able to represent their 
ambition in the procedures and systems they introduced – enacting money as if it could 
function differently – through listed wants and offers, local cheques, and trading days.
The importance of ‘doing’ – of actualising or enacting alternative institutional mean-
ings, such as of money – is an important dimension of prefiguration (Maeckelberg, 
2011). Materialising change and learning from doing it – ‘political pedagogy’ in de 
Smet’s (2015) terms – separates prefigurative politics from abstract left theorising. Yet, 
while much academic work focuses on the learning that ensues from practice, another 
dimension of material enactment can get glossed over. Because playing-with-revisions 
involves practice, it affects non-members also; and the recognition they return is central 
to role-play’s effects. Mainstream recognition, however, can prove a mixed bag. In the 
case of LETS, local council support meant funded development workers and public bod-
ies as scheme members. At the same time, the risk of LETS’ earnings being recognised 
as income for welfare and professional/commercial insurance purposes left many poten-
tial participants fearful of becoming involved. Frestonia faced a more ironic form of 
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recognition. Royal Mail briefly treated the micro-nation as a real one, sending some let-
ters with Frestonia postage stamps overseas.44 Horace Cutler, then leader of the Greater 
London Council, also playfully acknowledged its government. On receipt of Frestonia’s 
letter to Geoffrey Howe MP informing him of the new republic, he wrote: ‘All I can say 
is were you not to exist it would be necessary to invent you.’45
This kind of ironic recognition can contribute to the enduring unreality of state play. 
While LETS was hindered by state policies that treated its currency (if unevenly) as 
‘real’ money, and so analogous to other kinds of income, politicians’ public refusal to 
treat Frestonia as a constitutional threat, by engaging with it instead as play, consolidated 
its status as a cheeky form of ‘let’s pretend’. But recognition does not just operate as a 
bridging or ‘roping’ structure, pulling fictive or play-worlds (however understood by the 
mainstream) into an official reality. It is also a way of expanding the ‘minor-stream’ 
worlds lived (in) as if they were real through the recognition that prefigurative initiatives 
grant each other.46 Does this, then, mean prefigurative play gives rise to two discrete and 
separate processes – a mocking or destructive recognition from elite forces and a valoris-
ing recognition from grass-roots ones? I want to complicate this division in my fourth 
prefigurative act.
Acting as if a more radical proposal was already on the law reform table
Earlier, I discussed the controversy over reforming state law to treat gender as an elective 
identity. In this final example, I want to approach prefigurative law reform from a differ-
ent angle and ask: what value is there in a research project acting as if more radical pro-
posals around gender were on the law reform table?47 In their 2017/18 consultation on 
reforming the Gender Recognition Act, policy-makers in both Scotland and England and 
Wales solicited public views on how and whether to make gender transitioning easier and 
less pathologising. Questions posed included: how many transitions can someone have; 
to what genders; at what age; and through what means?48 Yet, a more fundamental ques-
tion remained unasked, even as it became tacitly invoked by the move towards self-
determination and the growing gender-neutrality of statutory law: Are there good reasons 
for people to continue to be legally gendered, issuing from the sex registered at birth? 
This ‘decertification’ question (Cooper & Renz, 2016) is at the heart of a three-year col-
laborative research project on the Future of Legal Gender (FLaG).49
In Britain, different social relations structure people’s lives, as they also structure the 
law, but many – including ethnicity, sexuality and religion – do not give rise to a legally 
assigned personal status, for instance as gay or Jewish. In contrast, the formal legal status 
accorded sex/gender places people within defined categories and obliges them to undergo 
official procedures for their status to change. Legal gender status doesn’t just affect those 
who need to transition or who object to the category they are placed within. The sym-
bolic importance which the law attaches to a binary structure, in requiring birth-sex to be 
registered, suggests that sex – lived socially as gender – marks a distinction that is 
human-shaped and that matters. This is not just a critical mattering; it is also a normative 
claim about who and what we are (see Cooper & Emerton, 2020). But what alternative 
arrangements are possible? And can a prefigurative law reform project help to anticipate 
and establish pathways for reform? We might think of prefiguration here as having two 
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dimensions. The first centres on process, and the challenge of undertaking a mock law 
reform project in collaborative, critically reflexive ways (see also Macdonald & Kong, 
2006, p. 27). The second, which I want to consider, involves taking a radical proposal, 
not currently on the law reform table, and acting as if it was already under review, and so 
accelerating its detailed consideration (if not its enactment). De Smet’s (2015) discussion 
of Vygotsky and ‘proleptic learning’ is useful here. Proleptic learning involves 
‘anticipat[ing] or imagin[ing] competence through the representation of a future act or 
development as already existing’ (de Smet, 2015, p. 91). A prefigurative law reform pro-
ject comes to understand the implications of legal change by acting as if the questions 
and choices at stake were reasonable to attend to in the present. But does this assume that 
what we learn today about future possible changes to legal gender status will retain their 
value? In the case of law reform, the life expectancy of imagined consequences can be 
brief as conditions change, lessening the benefits of earlier rehearsal. I therefore want to 
consider the value of prefigurative law reform as an intervention in the present (rather 
than an effective managing of the future), and to address the significance of the ‘as if’ in 
this process.
The Future of Legal Gender (FLaG) did not represent itself as an advocacy project. 
Its aim was not to argue for a new legal agenda; that ‘decertification’ – understood as 
the withdrawal of state-assigned gender status – should be introduced. But does acting 
as if this proposal was already on the law reform table, in effect, put it there? FLaG 
certainly lacked the authorising conditions to render its proposal officially performative 
(cf. Law & Urry, 2004). It could not work in illocutionary ways by requiring or ensuring 
decertification was given consideration by state bodies, even as it might contribute to 
the emergence of a more official proposal in the future (although a backlash could cause 
it to have the reverse effect). Yet, regardless of whether decertification emerges as a 
‘real’ legal proposal, as an imagined measure, that also constituted an emergent meth-
odology for doing socio-legal research, decertification was saturated with belief that it 
could act. For our part, we hoped its exploration through interviews, seminars and other 
forms of public engagement would offer, in the current fraught scene, a more explora-
tory, less judgemental space for gender’s consideration, one that could incorporate some 
marginalised perspectives, cleavages and questions. With politically lower stakes, 
looser attachments, and the inevitable temporal space between now and any future-
present of the law reforms proposed, more flexible and plural conceptualisations of 
gender might also be possible, away from the rigid monolithic definitions – that this is 
what sex or gender really means, for example.
The value of a prefigurative law reform project, then, is not just, or even principally, 
about preparing (for) the future but about alternative discursive lines in the now. Yet, this 
may suggest prefigurative law reform projects can insulate themselves and so provide 
participants with a politically constructive, ‘safe’ refuge away from the ‘real world’ fray. 
Law reform projects, however – including this one – are not that insulated; and this is a 
source of both difficulty and challenge. If proposals are seen – or can be depicted – as 
‘real’ law-making, or if they get presented as the scary place that moderate-sounding 
legal measures will inevitably lead to, this can intensify divisions and anxieties, under-
mining the capacity of a prefigurative law reform project to enact an exploratory delib-
erative space. While it is the credible appearance of prefigurative law reform proposals 
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which incites serious attention, for such attention to remain focused on the merits (or 
otherwise) of the reform rather than on (challenging) its realisation, the ‘as if’ simulated 
character of the proposal needs to be explicitly sustained.
Conclusion
Prefiguration is sometimes dismissed as a minor form of politics – too small-scale and 
marginal, too invested in its own purity, voluntary action, and dream-world to be a poli-
tics that matters or that adds much given the tremendous contemporary crises that we 
face. But without romanticising prefigurative politics or suggesting it is the only politics 
worth pursuing, this discussion works from the assumption that prefiguration remains 
important, including – and, perhaps, especially – at times of political despair when much 
needed “transfers of power” seem out of reach. This article has sought to contribute to 
prefigurative thinking by focusing on institutions in conjunction with a specific form of 
prefiguration, attuned to the ‘as if’. Drawing on research I have carried out, including 
collaboratively, over two decades, it draws together four very different kinds of prefigu-
rative activity: (1) where local government acts as if it has authority to engage in inter-
national policy-making and global solidarity despite countervailing national government 
policies, authority and alliances; (2) where state law acts as if it has the authority to 
establish gender’s terms and categories, including by changing understandings of gen-
der’s meaning in the process; (3) where grass-roots communities act as if they have the 
power and right to remake institutions of money and state; and (4) where researchers act 
as if a different, more radical proposal was already on the law reform table, and so 
deserving of serious consideration.
At the heart of this discussion lies the question: what do such initiatives create; and 
what does reading them as prefigurative make visible? Typically, work on prefigurative 
politics and counter-institutions foregrounds three features: learning, practising and 
showcasing. This article has considered how prefiguring institutions innovates, ener-
gises, stimulates, anticipates, hurries and normalises. However, in understanding what 
prefiguring does, this article has also foregrounded a different, less attended-to aspect, 
namely how prefiguring institutions mediates, reconstitutes and troubles the interrela-
tionship of the real to the imaginary (recognising the imaginary is also, in its own sense, 
real; cf. Bottici, 2014). This relationship comes to the fore in the authorising conditions 
that prefiguration relies upon, and the work recognition does (and doesn’t) do, within 
diffuse and unequal circuits of power.
A central paradox of prefiguration is that it takes the meanings, conditions and legiti-
macy it seeks as if they already existed. In a sense, we might describe it as a form of 
retro-figuring, reliant on imagined antecedents that authorise, for instance, councils’ 
engagement in foreign policy and street squatters’ state secession. For while prefigura-
tion takes up future-oriented aspirations as enactable present-day practices and norms, it 
also relies on this future as already in place to authorise the actions it undertakes. This 
can be read as an imagined form of backfilling undertaken playfully or seriously. But this 
backfilling can also prove performative – retrospectively creating the authorising condi-
tions relied upon. Local government’s legitimate capacity to engage in international poli-
cymaking, for instance, is not predetermined. However, while municipalities may act as 
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if they have authority – putting permissions or entitlements in place by treating them as 
if they were already there – whether this proves successful depends on what councils and 
the network of actors, who support, thwart or otherwise affect council actions, also do.
Acting as if the necessary conditions are already in place, particularly when under-
taken seriously, can be challenged. But the challenging (and other) effects of intervening 
bodies also structures forward-oriented conditions of accomplishment, and one impor-
tant process here is how recognition happens. The prefigurative acts discussed are not 
siloes. Their existence, effects and force are mediated by mainstream institutions along 
with other bodies, and this mediation also shapes how and whether institutional prefigu-
ration is recognised as ‘real’ (and so not read in the terms of the ‘as if’). For while pre-
figuration can involve deliberately reaching beyond what can be accomplished, it can 
also be a way of reading initiatives and reforms that receive insufficient recognition to be 
realised, and which lack the force to bring such recognition into effect. At the same time, 
recognition as real is far from uncomplicatedly positive. Initiatives may be framed as 
‘wrongly real’, and so subject to criticism and attack as municipal boycotts and legisla-
tive consultation on recognising a third gender experienced. Recognition as real-like 
may also carry costs as local currencies encountered, shoe-horned into a restrictive and 
penal wider welfare culture. In such conditions, it may seem as if explicit recognition as 
‘not-real’ is preferable – where simulations are authorised and validated as imaginative 
ventures not intended to pass. Approaching initiatives in this way might prefigure a more 
explicitly experimental and playful politics. While Frestonia shows how recognition as 
play can trivialise and dismiss, it can also protect initiatives by diminishing their threat. 
Instead of being denounced as grievous or seditious, initiatives become forms of inven-
tion, art, or recreation, occupying a separate, bounded play-world in which their claims 
can stand. But what happens when the tacit contract is broken, and prefigurative play 
seeps out?
It is tempting to suggest that prefiguring institutions needs to come out either on 
the side of fictive play or on the side of an ambition to be recognised as real. However, 
at its heart, prefiguration – whether as a political orientation, specific form of prac-
tice, or register of understanding – involves the complex relationship between the 
imaginary, the fictive and the real. At one level, acting as if things were otherwise 
invokes a conscious distinction between the real and the fictive – where the imaginary 
is juxtaposed against what is realised as true. At another level, acting ‘as if’ undoes 
the distinction as actions based on counterhegemonic understandings and norms 
change what is (and what is becoming). But prefiguration also embodies something 
else, and that is the coexisting, overlapping, multiplicity of institutional worlds. 
Prefiguration undercuts the notion of institutional life as a clear, zero-sum, singular 
plane (or world). This is not simply because partially-recognised and minor counter-
institutions exist alongside dominant ones, communicating, effecting and interacting 
with them (although this indeed occurs). It is also because what institutions are 
depends on the facts, legitimacy, roles, authority and functions underpinning and 
expressed by them, and these different dimensions are frequently in dispute. Acts that 
are anchored in different normative and epistemic beliefs produce different defini-
tions and accounts of the acts. LETS, for instance, both was and wasn’t money; 
municipal engagement in BDS both was and wasn’t authoritative state action. This 
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multiplicity is more than simply disagreement or different views about what is hap-
pening. Since imaginaries of authority, role, function and legitimacy (among others) 
help make institutions up, it is also, importantly, about different happenings (see also 
Law & Urry, 2004, p. 397). Prefiguration unsettles political certainty when it comes 
to what institutions are and what they do. While this creates risks, it also creates hope.
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25. House Bill no. 2320, Session of 2019.
26. Scottish Government, Review of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 – A Consultation; https://
consult.gov.scot/family-law/review-of-the-gender-recognition-act-2004/user_uploads/
sct1017251758-1_gender_p4–3-.pdf
27. Women’s Spaces in Scotland response to Scottish consultation on reforming the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, emphasis added.
28. See Fair Play for Women, ‘Guide to the Scottish Consultation on Reform of the Gender 
Recognition Act’; https://fairplayforwomen.com/scotland/. See also Kay Green, ‘Time for 
socialists to take action against gender stereotyping’, Morning Star, 17 October 2019 https://
morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/time-socialists-take-action-against-gender-stereotyping.
29. ‘Legal fiction’ can be interpreted in different ways, e.g. see Fuller (1930), Knauer (2010) 
and Petroski (2013). In one sense, it suggests law and social life operate through different 
epistemological registers, such that all legal categories are social fictions; and, thus, not 
legal fictions at all but rather legal truths. Alternatively, it suggests that apart from limited 
exceptions, the expectation is that legal discourse corresponds to social reality (as it is or 
should be).
30. On corporate personhood as something that exceeds and is irreducible to its legal form, see 
Bashkow (2014).
31. To see it as a legal fiction, however, also assumes legal persons are analogous to human 
persons; for critical engagement in relation to rivers as legal persons, see Clark et al. (2018); 
and see Mussawir and Parsley (2017) for a critical reading of contemporary elisions between 
human and legal personhood.
32. This was affirmed in R (on the application of TT) v. Registrar General for England and Wales 
and Others [2019] EWHC 2384 (Fam).
33. R (on the application of TT) v. Registrar General for England and Wales and Others [2019] 
EWHC 2384 (Fam), paras 279, 280.
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34. As one critic has written, ‘It pins everyone to the idea of innate gender characteristics, so 
if it gets into legislation, we get courts enforcing a sexist ideology. That is the end of free-
dom of speech and belief’; Kay Green, ‘Time for socialists to take action against gender 
stereotyping’, Morning Star, 17 October 2019; https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/
time-socialists-take-action-against-gender-stereotyping
35. Although see also Macdonald (2011) on giving too much weight to the written word of state 
law as a form of ‘contemporary legal evangelicalism’.
36. See Bailey (2008, p. 588) for a useful discussion of the state’s place in ‘political struggle 
[that] pits symbolic powers against one another, each trying to define the legitimate vision of 
the social world’ and ‘to make their visions and divisions of the social world “stick”’. Using 
Bourdieu, Bailey (2008) addresses how the state’s symbolic power is structured by the com-
peting symbolic power of other forces and bodies.
37. Opponents of legal recognition for non-binary genders argue it treats a ‘fictive’ gender as 
real. While their opposition targets the claims about gender being made, the ‘as if’ quality of 
legal action can be read differently – not as targeting the authenticity of certain genders but 
of institutional capacity – in state law acting as if its recognition has a gender-declarative or 
confirmatory power.
38. I explore this further in Cooper (2019a, Ch. 4, 6).
39. For a different approach, where children use play prefiguratively, acting (through play) as if 
they have a right to urban spaces, and prefiguring a different, more child-friendly approach to 
the city, see Carroll et al. (2019).
40. The Republic of Frestonia archive; http://www.frestonia.org/
41. See J. Harris, ‘Freedom for Frestonia: the London commune that cut loose from the UK’, 
The Guardian, 30 October 2017; www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/30/frestonia-london- 
commune-squatters
42. As such, they parallel another counter-institutional form, People’s Tribunals, which assume 
responsibilities and powers, usually associated with states, to hold bodies to account, in order 
to bring corporate and state harms to light and identify forms of accountability and redress; 
see Borowiak (2008) and Simm and Byrnes (2014).
43. I explore this further in Cooper (2019a).
44. Other mail was impounded; see www.frestonia.org/frestonian-postage-stamps/
45. See letter from Horace Cutler, 25 July 1978; www.frestonia.org/response-from-horace-cutler- 
leader-of-the-glc/
46. This may prove a limited recognition given the scanty powers grass-roots bodies typically 
marshal. Role-played institutions may be hailed by grass-roots bodies according to their self-
determined name and identity but the structural relations and connections that give recogni-
tion the power to make a difference may be missing. While power is diffuse, emergent and not 
fully delimited, it is, of course, very far from evenly exercised, created or held.
47. On the performativity of scholarship, see Law and Urry (2004); and on prefigurative theory, 
see Davies (2017, p. 17).
48. See, for instance, Scottish Government Review of the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 – Consultation.
49. The project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council from 2018-2021. 
Alongside myself, Emily Grabham, Elizabeth Peel and Flora Renz were co-investigators, and 
Robyn Emerton and Han Newman project researchers; see https://futureoflegalgender.kcl.ac.uk/
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